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SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN CHARLESTON
COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA
Steven Croley*
INTRODUCTION

The "frontiers of tort law" are procedural, as well as doctrinal
and theoretical. Sooner or later, influential views of the tort system
develop doctrinal and, thus, procedural manifestations. For instance,
the claims of tort reformers who argued that the civil litigation
system permits plaintiffs with weak claims to fool juries led to rules
tightening the admissibility of evidence.' For another example,
reformers' claims that meritless medical malpractice claims drove up
physicians' insurance premiums led some jurisdictions to adopt rules
requiring medical malpractice plaintiffs to file affidavits of merit
(signed by a physician) along with their complaint.' In short, critical
views of the tort system that take hold eventually translate into
differences in the way tort cases are litigated, which is, of course,
exactly what reformers intend.
Procedural change also reflects other features of the law. In
particular, where the costs of litigating are high, parties will seek
cheaper ways to air their claims. Thus in recent decades, alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") has been promoted as a useful method of
resolving some types of civil claims.' Developments in ADR do not
* © Steven P. Croley, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
participants of the Loyola Law School Civil Justice Program's symposium on the Frontiers of
Tort Law, January 25-26, 2008, for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and

Federal Civil Litigation 17, n.76 (Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies Research Papers Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 71, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=968834.
2. See, e.g., Tort Reform Act of 2005 Relating to Medical Malpractice, S. 83, 116th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005); S.B. 2199, 59th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2005); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §600.2912d(l) (West 2000).
3. See generally DONNA STIENSTRA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION: DO THEY HAVE A PLACE IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS? (Fed. Judicial Ctr.

1995) (weighing the pros and cons of alternative dispute resolution); Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal,
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reflect changes in doctrine so much as litigants' self-interested
efforts to find less expensive ways to settle their claims, though as
ADR took root (and developed a constituency) it also became legally
required in some jurisdictions.' Today, most trial courts employ
some kind of ADR mechanism. 5 Indeed, many state courts, and
some federal district courts, now have mandatory ADR programs.6
Although ADR is now an established feature of the civil
litigation system, one species of it-the "summary jury trial"-never
gained much lasting traction.7 In the early 1980s, some courts
experimented with this procedure,8 allowing (or in some cases
requiring) parties to present abbreviated versions of their case to a
live jury. As explained below, the point of this summary procedure
was to give each side a chance to test its case before a jury, to hear
the other side do the same, and to get the benefit of feedback in the
form of the jury's decision following the miniature trial.9 The
process thus aimed to provide litigants with important information
about the value of their cases, thereby encouraging settlement." The
procedure was not binding, however, and thus its success depended
on participants choosing to adopt the summary jury's verdict as their
settlement. They did not often do so, so litigants and judges turned
to less cumbersome ways to press their claims and promote
settlement.'1
While the summary jury trial is largely a footnote in the annals
of ADR, variations on this procedure are successfully used in a few
places today. 2 The trial court of Charleston County, South Carolina
Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (1992) (recognizing the disparate impact of discovery expenses).
4.

STIENSTRA & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 5.

5. See id. at 5.
6. See, e.g., DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, MOTION

PRACTICE § 8.04[A] (Aspen Publishers, Supp. 2007); Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An
Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1446-47 (1997).
7. Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Trial, 41 DUKE L.J. 806, 806
(1992).
8. See, e.g., D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT

JUDGES 68 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1986) (noting that by the mid 1980s more than two dozen federal
judges had experimented with summary jury trials).
9. Metzloff, supra note 7, at 812-13.
10. Id. at 815.
11. Id. at 807-08.
12. See Nora Lockwood Tooher, Summary Jury Trials Slowly Catching On as Form of
Alternative, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Apr. 27, 2005.
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is one such place. There, summary jury trials are frequently used to
resolve certain categories of civil cases, especially low-dollar tort
cases. Because the stakes in such cases are often low relative to the
costs of litigating the cases through traditional methods, the summary
jury trial provides an opportunity for trial that would otherwise be
cost-prohibitive. And, because the process is fast and cheap relative
to ordinary litigation, it enjoys the strong support not only of local
plaintiff's lawyers but the local defense bar as well.
The narrow purpose of this Article is to explain and defend
Charleston County's version of the summary jury trial. Charleston's
summary jury trial provides access to justice for one category of civil
litigants who would otherwise lack such access, and better, it does so
without presenting any of the problems that critics of the tort system
claim plague civil litigation. Although Charleston's summary jury
trial comes with one controversial feature-explained below-the
process warrants consideration by other jurisdictions for a certain
category of civil cases.
The broader purpose of this Article, though, is to begin (barely)
to merge the topic of civil justice reform, on the one hand, with
concerns for greater access to justice, on the other hand.
Notwithstanding their emphasis on the high costs of litigation, civil
justice reformers selectively ignore the problems faced by plaintiffs
with meritorious claims for whom the costs of litigation are too high
relative to the small size of their damages. Meanwhile, those calling
for greater access to civil justice have given little attention to tort
plaintiffs with low-damages cases, as opposed to other kinds of civil
plaintiffs who also lack access to civil justice. Yet tort plaintiffs in
low-damages cases constitute an important set of underrepresented
civil litigants: given the costs of litigation, and the attendant
difficulties of finding legal representation for cases involving modest
damages, tort plaintiffs with strong liability claims but not exorbitant
damages have little access to justice. Civil justice reformers should
acknowledge as much, while advocates for greater access to justice
should take up their cause as well.
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I. SUMMARY JURY TRIALS

A. A Primer

With some forum-to-forum variation, summary jury trials in
their first incarnation generally had several features.13 First, as their

name suggests, they were short. 14 In some jurisdictions that
experimented with summary jury trials, litigants had to start and
finish their trials within one hour.15 Such jurisdictions gave litigants
little more than an opportunity to summarize their cases to the jury,
perhaps with evidentiary exhibits. 6

More commonly, though,

summary jury trials could last up to one full trial day. 7 Either way,
summary jury trials emphasized the "summary" and downplayed the
"trial."
Their short duration was in part a consequence of another central

feature: in a summary jury trial, many evidentiary rules were
relaxed. 8 For example, lawyers could read deposition testimony to

the jury for nearly any purpose, not only for impeachment. 9 They
could read the deposition testimony of friendly witnesses, for
instance, or have that testimony read by a stand-in "witness"
pretending to be the deponent by reading deposition answers to the

jury while being asked deposition questions by the lawyer. In other
words, these stand-in witnesses replayed portions of the actual

deposition before the jury, as if the deponent were testifying live.
13. See generally Thomas D. Lambros, Summary Jury Trial and OtherAlternative Methods

of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.D.R. 461 (1984) (discussing the use of alternative methods of
dispute resolution but focusing on the summary jury trial); Metzloff, supra note 7, at 807
(acknowledging that the summary jury trial can fulfill a distinct and useful role once it is "freed
from artificial limitations placed upon it by its earliest users"); S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury
Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829 (1986) (explaining the summary jury trial, "its evolution,
philosophy, and effectiveness").
14. See, e.g., Metzloff, supra note 7, at 808.
15. See, e.g., "Mini-Trials" Prove Cost-Effective Way to Seek Justice, JURY POOL NEWS,

Spring 2003, at 1 (newsletter of the N.Y. State Unified Court System). "In summary jury trials
each side is permitted an hour to present its case-plus 10 minutes each for opening and closing
statements-and a maximum of two witnesses." Id.
16. Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back on the Docket:
Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1069, 1076-77
(1995).
17. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 369 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Thomas B Metzloff, Improving the Summary Jury Trial, 77 JUDICATURE 9, 9

(1994).
19. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 13, at 831.
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Alternatively, lawyers could simply summarize or characterize
deposition testimony to the jury, without either reading the transcript
or play-acting with a stand-in witness.2" They could do so even
during closing arguments."
The rules of hearsay were also relaxed. 2 For instance, medical
hearsay was often permitted, so that parties could explain to the jury
what medical records said, or what a doctor said about a particular
issue. Relaxing the rules of evidence in this way also saved time,
allowing parties to cut to the chase rather than establish foundations,
authenticate records, and, most of all, call numerous witnesses in
order to establish some factual element of their case. No less
importantly, it also allowed parties to avoid paying witnesses to
appear in court, which is to say to travel to court and wait until they
were called to testify. In short, the summary jury process was
designed to be not only quick, but inexpensive.
A judge presided over the summary trial, as in an ordinary case,
though the judge's role in ensuring proper application of the rules of
evidence was diminished. Otherwise, the judge functioned as in an
ordinary trial-ruling on motions, instructing the jury, and so on.
Lawyers showed the same deference toward the presiding judge as
they would in an ordinary civil trial.
Following trial, the judge instructed and charged the jury.2 3
While the jury functioned much as an ordinary jury would, usually
summary jury trials were heard by minijuries, sometimes by as few
24
as four jurors. After deliberation, the jury rendered its verdict.
Often, the jury was instructed to render a verdict on liability and
damages separately, and to assess damages even if it found no
liability. The jury's assessment of damages even where it found no
liability gave litigating parties the benefit of more information about
their cases.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo County Trial Rule 27.04, http://www.netlawlibraries.com/
slob/slob_027.html. See generally Lambros, supra note 13, at 471 ("No testimony is taken from
sworn witnesses. Counsel simply summarize the anticipated testimony of trial witnesses and are
free to present exhibits to the jury.").
23. Spiegel, supra note 13, at 831.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., id. at 829.
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In the end, the parties to a summary jury trial could elect to
adopt the verdict rendered or not. In other words, the process was
not binding.26 The fact that summary jury trials were not binding
was a central feature of the process of the 1980s. 7 So was their
involuntary nature. 8 That is, judges often required parties to
participate in summary jury trials before they could try their cases
before an ordinary jury.2 9 For a time, that requirement proved more
controversial than other forms of mandatory ADR.3 ° In fact, some
commentators argued that federal judges lacked the power to require
litigants to participate in summary jury trials.3' In the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990,32 Congress eliminated that objection by
explicitly authorizing the use of mandatory summary jury trials,
provided that judges employed the procedure as part of some
comprehensive case management plan.33
B. Justifications
Those advocating-and judges requiring-the use of the
summary jury trial justified the process on two main grounds. First,

26. See, e.g., STIENSTRA & WILLGING, supra note 3, at 64; Thomas D. Lambros, The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:A New AdversarialModel for a New Era, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
789, 798-99 (1989); Spiegel, supra note 13, at 831. According to Lambros:
The summary jury trial is not intended to supplant the traditional jury trial. Instead,
judges should employ the device when conventional lawyer-judge negotiations fail to
produce settlement. This effective judicial procedure fosters meaningful settlement
discussions between parties whose uncompromising bargaining positions require a
deliberate and controlled context to move toward agreement.
Lambros, supra, at 798-99.
27. Lambros, supra note 26, at 798-99.
28. See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 16, at 1085 ("But in an effort to deal with burgeoning
caseloads, some federal courts have approved compulsory SJT use, without the parties' mutual
agreement, based on the Rules and the courts' inherent authority.").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1085 ("Differing court views hinge primarily on the interpretation of the explicit
language of Rule 16 and its underlying policies as stated in the notes of the advisory
committee.").
31. See, e.g., Maria Moore, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Too Hasty a Solution to the
Growing Problem ofJudicialInefficiency?, 14 REV. LITIG. 495, 506-508 (1995) (arguing that in
some cases, mandatory summary jury trials may violate litigants' due process rights).
32. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482 (West 2008).
33. Id. §473(a)(6)(B); see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual
Obligation,46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1293 (1994); Metzloff, supranote 18, at 11.

Summer 2008]

SUMMAR Y JURY TRIALS

1591

summary jury trials would help with docket control.34 Especially
during a period when many argued that civil dockets were
overburdened, resolving cases through summary jury trials, like any
other forms of ADR, was seen as a significant potential advantage.35
Some judges thus turned to the process to trim dockets.36
Second, the summary jury trial was said to encourage
settlement.37 The process gave opposing litigants the benefit not only
of presenting and thus testing their own cases, but also of hearing the

other side's case as well.38 As a result, both sides would reassess the
strength of their own case in light of their opponent's presentation.39
Litigants could then make better informed and more realistic
settlement calculations. "
To be sure, other forms of ADR also provide litigants an
opportunity to "present" their cases and to measure their opponent's.
But the summary jury's reaction to the case was thought to promote

settlement even more."

The benefit of a real jury's reaction was

precisely why the summary trial was a jury trial, and most
distinguished the procedure from other forms of ADR.42 Of course,
parties have long used "mock juries" to test their cases before lay

jurors. But again, the summary jury trial allowed for more realistic
assessments of jury reactions, given the presence of both a real
opponent and a live jury who answered to the presiding judge and
was not paid by a mock litigant.43 Because the summary jury trial

34. See, e.g., Joseph Gerace, Preface to NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROGRAM, PROGRAM MANUAL 4, 5 (Joseph Gerace
&
Kathleen
D.
Krauza
eds.,
N.Y.
Supp.
2004),
available
at
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/8jd/pdfs/SJTmanual3.pdf ("The SJT program resulted in the
scheduling of 90 fewer cases for regular jury trials between those years resulting in significant
saving of trial days ....
[T]here is no doubt that the Summary Jury Trial project was a key
factor."); Vesselin Mitev, Staying Afloat: More Cases Challenge Suffolk Courts, N.Y. L. J., Jan.
15, 2008 ("'[The summary jury trial was] one way of moving cases along and it is certainly much
more expeditious,' said Suffolk chief Assistant District Attorney John L. Buonora, who pioneered
the effort last year while serving as bar association president.").
35. See, e.g., Mitev, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Lambros, supra note 13, at 468-69; Ponte, supra note 16, at 1073.
38. Ponte, supra note 16, at 1072-73.
39. Metzloff, supra note 7 at 812-13.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 815-16.
42. Id. at 816.
43. Id. at 816.
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verdict was sure to disappoint at least one side, and perhaps partly
both sides, it would give parties reason to think carefully about

settlement. 4
These two justifications for the summary jury trial were of
course related. If the procedure promoted settlement, it would
reduce judicial dockets. Even so, proponents counted separately the
benefits to the judiciary of reducing crowded litigation dockets on
the one hand, and the private benefits to settling parties of resolving
their cases on the other.4 5 In other words, while the two benefits of
summary jury trials would be realized together, one focused on
aiding courts, while the other focused on helping litigants.
C. Disappointment
The summary jury trial process never caught on.46 While the use
of other forms of ADR grew, the summary jury trial faded. Even at

their peak, summary jury trials were not very common outside of a
few jurisdictions.4 7 Today, the process is rarely used.48

Summary jury trials faded from obscurity into oblivion for
several reasons. For one, some of the procedure's most enthusiastic
judicial supporters retired. Its greatest enthusiast and pioneer was
Judge Thomas Lambros of the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio.49 First among federal judges, and years before
Congress specifically authorized the practice, Judge Lambros
required litigants in his court to participate in summary jury trials.5
He believed litigants who learned what a jury could do would have

44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participation in Innovative Pretrial
Proceedings, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 290, 318 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Tooher, supra note 12. As reported:
[E]ven its staunchest proponents concede that the summary jury trial has been slow to
catch on. Florida, Texas and Virginia have incorporated summary jury trials into their
civil practice statutes. A dozen other states and some federal courts also conduct them
sporadically. But nearly a decade after its introduction, the summary jury trial has
failed to win over the majority of trial lawyers and judges.
Molly McDonough, Summary Time Blues, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 2004.
47. McDonough, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 16, at 1072; see also supra notes 13, 22.
50. Thomas D. Lambros, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure:A New Adversarial Model
fora New Era, 50 U. Pirr. L. REv. 789, 799-800 (1989).
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strong incentives to settle, which would in turn trim court dockets."
He argued that federal judges had authority to require summary jury
trials under Rules 1 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and by virtue of courts' inherent powers. 2 Exercising that power, he
included dates for summary jury trials in his Rule 16 scheduling
orders, as the penultimate procedural stage in a case before an
ordinary trial." While Judge Lambros had his critics, his advocacy
led the Judicial Conference of the United States to endorse the
experimental use of summary jury trials by federal judges.54 Judge
Lambros retired, however, in 1996, and his enthusiasm proved not to
be widely infectious. With such advocates of the process no longer
occupying the federal bench, Congress's express authorization of the
process has had little lasting effect.5
But summary jury trials would have outlasted their original
proponents if they had vindicated those proponents' justifications by
trimming dockets and settling claims. They did neither. Or at least,
they did neither demonstrably. In 1986, Judge Richard Posner
argued that then-available data (which Posner rightly pointed out
were sparse and crude) did not show that summary jury trials led to a
decrease in trials, an increase in settlements, or a decrease in the
disposition time for suits.56 He thus invited supporters of the
summary jury trial to demonstrate its successes,57 a challenge that
went unanswered. To the present, there are no studies confirming
that summary jury trials reduced dockets or promoted settlement.
While other forms of ADR have many advocates-and provide the
focus for numerous studies-the summary jury trial by contrast has
few champions. Thus, processes based on the model of summary
trials are used in only a handful of state jurisdictions, on a voluntary
basis, and in most instances without a jury.
While summary jury trials are no longer required, however,
there is nothing to stop enterprising litigants from electing to use the
51. Id.
52. Ponte, supra note 16, at 1075-76.
53. Id. at 1080.
54. See Metzloff, supra note 7, at 811-12 & n.19 (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES 88 (1984)).
55. See Ponte, supra note 16, at 1085; Metzloff, supra note 7, at 812-15.
56. Posner, supra note 17, at 382-85.
57. See id. at 393.
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process. Litigants seeking to resolve their cases through some
procedure short of an ordinary civil trial, but with the benefit of a
real jury who might break an impasse in settlement negotiations,
could use the summary jury trial to do so. Litigants so motivated
might even elect to make the summary jury's verdict binding, just as
litigants might choose binding arbitration. In that light, the summary
jury trial resembles other forms of voluntary ADR, with a judge in
place of an arbitrator, and a real jury present to render a verdict on
liability and, if necessary, award damages. 8
Such litigants could create such a procedure for themselves by
contract. Such a contract could specify that their case would be
resolved through a summary jury trial with specified features. It
would be enforceable like any other contract providing for binding
ADR processes. The obstacles litigants seeking to resolve their cases
in this way would face, then, would not be legal, but purely practical,
i.e. where will they get a real jury, a judge, and a place to try their
case? A state court in South Carolina has answered that question.
II. A SPECIAL CASE: SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

Charleston County, South Carolina, together with neighboring
Berkeley County, comprise South Carolina's Ninth Circuit Court.5 9
The circuit courts are South Carolina's trial courts, with jurisdiction
over non-misdemeanor criminal cases (known then as the "Court of
General Sessions") and civil cases involving money or property
exceeding $7,500 in value (the "Court of Common Pleas").6 ° The
circuit courts are supported administratively by county Clerks of the
Court, part of county government. Although the circuit court judges
are selected by election of the state legislature and are paid by the
state, the Ninth Circuit, like every other, has a small number of

58. See Metzloff, supra note 7, at 806.
59. See South Carolina Judicial Department, Map of Circuit Court Judges,
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/circuitCourt/circuitMap.cfin (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
60. See
South
Carolina
Judicial
Department,
Circuit
Court,
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/CircuitCourt (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); see also Clerk of the
Court:
Charleston
County,
South
Carolina,
General
Information,
http://www3.charlestoncounty.org/docs/CoC/general.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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"resident judges". 6 Otherwise, circuit judges (of which there are
forty-six) rotate among the state's different circuit courts.
Here, the summary jury trial is not only alive, but well.
Working together, the local plaintiff and defense bars of Charleston
County have developed a version of the summary jury trial that not
only resolves cases quickly and inexpensively, but also provides a
class of civil litigants with access to civil justice they would
otherwise lack.
A. PROCEDURE
Charleston's summary jury trial resembles the modal summary
jury trial described above, but with two crucial exceptions. 6 First,
the process is entirely voluntary. Unlike the federal judges who first
developed the summary jury trial, the South Carolina bench does not
compel parties to use the process. Moreover, there is no other
mandatory ADR process in the Charleston County Circuit Court. In
other words, litigants there do not choose summary jury trials
because they are required to try some form of ADR or another
anyway.
Second, for those who elect to use the process, it is binding. Or
put differently, summary jury trials are used in Charleston County
only by parties who elect to make the outcome fully binding. They
do so by agreeing in writing to be bound by the verdict, as explained
in more detail below. Thus, the two main features of the summary
jury trial used by some federal judges in the 1980s-a process
involuntary and nonbinding-are reversed in Charleston.
Otherwise, the process would look familiar to the early
advocates of summary jury trials. First, although Charleston's
summary jury trial has no time limit, in fact most summary trials are
concluded within a day, and most of those that last longer are
completed during the second day. Litigants, not facing tight time
61. South Carolina Judicial Department, Circuit Court, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. The descriptions of Charleston's summary jury trial above and throughout are based on
confidential telephone and personal interviews of Charleston lawyers and judges extremely
familiar with the process, as well as conversations with court personnel, and observations of jury
selection and trial. The description of summary jury trials offered here is not intended as a
rigorous, authoritative documentation of the practice. On the other hand, the legal subculture in
question is small and accessible. Surely the account of Charleston's summary jury trial provided
here would be unobjectionable to anybody familiar with it.
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constraints, may call live witnesses. They may also, instead,
summarize what testimony a witness would give if called, based on
the absent witness's prior deposition testimony, which litigants may
summarize or read. In practice, the ability to read or summarize
witness testimony instead of calling live witnesses means that the
only live witnesses tend to be the parties themselves.
In Charleston's summary jury trials, too, the rules of evidence
are substantially relaxed.
Litigants can make some hearsay
objections, for example, but there is no rule barring hearsay in the
context of medical reports and opinions. Thus, litigants and their
witnesses may inform the jury about what a doctor said, or what is
contained within medical records. This rule applies to medical
experts as well, so that in a personal injury case, for example, neither
side must pay a medical expert to appear and testify in court.
In court, indeed: Charleston's summary jury trials are conducted
in the county courthouse, in the same courtrooms used for ordinary
civil and criminal trials. In every way, they look like ordinary civil
trials. Anyone who walked into a summary jury trial in Charlestonwith the exception of experienced trial lawyers and evidence
experts-would think he or she had walked into an ordinary trial.
Most interestingly, and somewhat controversially, it looks that
way to the jurors themselves, too. For the jurors used in Charleston's
summary jury trials are drawn from the same pool of prospective
jurors as those used in ordinary trials. In the Charleston County
Circuit Court, criminal and civil juries are selected from the same
jury pool on the same day, during a selection process overseen by a
judge assigned to manage jury selection for all trials scheduled for a
given period. Summary jurors are selected the exact same way from
the same pool. In other words, only chance determines if a given
prospective juror is ultimately chosen for a criminal trial, an ordinary
civil trial, a summary jury trial, or for no trial at all.
Charleston's summary jury trials are presided over by a "judge,"
chosen by agreement of the litigating parties. Those serving as
summary jury trial judges are in fact lawyers, who have their own
practices which may or may not include ADR as a component. The
relevant legal community from which summary jury trial lawyers
and judges come is small, close knit, and sophisticated. Its members
know one another, and a summary jury trial judge in one case could
be a summary jury trial lawyer in the next. Not surprisingly,
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summary jury trial judges are selected in part because of their
perceived evenhandedness, even if they themselves happen to
practice with the local plaintiff bar or defense bar. To that extent, the
presiding judge plays a role much like that of an arbitrator, but not
formally.
Formally, once the parties agree upon a summary jury trial
judge, they file a stipulated motion asking the real judge to designate
the selected "judge" as a "special judge" for the limited purposes of
their case, with "the authority to rule on all matters with regard to
procedures and evidence as if [he or she] were a sitting Circuit Court
Judge."' In other words, the summary jury trial judge is essentially
deputized by order of the court. Evidently, Charleston County
Circuit Court judges have the power to designate special judges for
limited purposes, roughly like federal judges might empower special
masters or advisory judges. Or, if they lack such power, no one
minds, and no one contests the orders making such a designation.
The deputized judges wear robes during the summary jury trial
process. In front of the jury, summary jury trial lawyers show the
same formalities and deference they would to an ordinary judge. In
the jury's absence, though, the procedure takes on a slightly less
formal air. Lawyers may or may not stand when addressing the court
and their tone resembles that which a lawyer might adopt before a
mediator or arbitrator, very respectful but not wholly deferential.
After all, the parties are paying the judges, though they are paying
them to perform as judges would.
An armed deputy marshal also occupies the courtroom, as in an
ordinary trial. The marshal's function is less clear, however.
Presumably the marshal would secure the courtroom, but it is
difficult to know who would threaten its security. Again, the parties
are there by agreement. So are witnesses; subpoenas for witnesses
are never necessary. Members of the public and the press do not
attend, nor would they know that a summary jury trial was taking
place. Although summary jury trials happen in real courtrooms,
using real jurors, they are not otherwise reflected on the court's
official calendar.

64. The quoted language comes from such a stipulated motion and order (on file with
author).
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The only usual participant missing from the summary jury trial
courtroom is the court reporter. For summary jury trials are not only
binding, but final. Because there is no appeal, there is no need for a
record, and thus the parties do not enlist a reporter. Once the jury
has rendered its verdict, the case is fully over, and the parties and
their lawyers go home with nothing left to do but carry out the
judgment.
In other words, there are no post-trial motions, for example. In
one interesting case, a summary jury trial judge granted a motion for
additur on the grounds that he had all the powers of a circuit court
judge for the purposes of the case, and those included the power to
entertain motions for additur or remittitur. But parties to summary
jury trials have since refined their agreements seeking designation of
a summary jury trial judge to make clear that the jury's decision is
fully final. Among the many cases resolved through summary jury
trials, the process has never derailed, or required intervention from
an ordinary circuit court judge. Upon completion of a summary jury
trial, the case is recorded on the official circuit court docket as
"resolved by settlement" as is any other case resolved by private
settlement.65
B. Controversy

As might be expected given the manner in which Charleston's
summary jurors are selected and how little they know about the
process of which they are the heart, Charleston's summary jury trials
have brought some controversy, although not a great deal. On the
whole, the process enjoys the support of participating parties
(naturally), the plaintiff bar, the defense bar, court staff, and court
administrators, including the elected Clerk of the Court.
Participating lawyers and "judges" speak about the process in
enthusiastic terms. Some have traveled by invitation to other states
to explain the process to interested bar associations.66
Even so, others have objected, most importantly on the grounds
that jurors should not be summoned by the state to do their civic duty
65. In a neighboring county-Dorchester County-within a different judicial circuit, which
also uses the summary jury trial process, the concluded summary jury trial is docketed instead as
a final judgment of the court, much as a judicially approved settlement or consent decree might
be.
66. See Tooher, supra note 12.
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(of course, ultimately under threat of compulsion) and then used,
unknowingly, to assist parties employing what is essentially a private
procedure to settle their dispute. According to this objection, if
parties want to employ the summary jury trial process, they should
be explicit with jurors that that is what they are doing, perhaps pay
jurors who agree to participate for their time, and allow those not
interested in participating to leave. In Charleston, summary jurors
are instead led to believe they are jurors in an ordinary case. They
are selected in what appears to be the ordinary process, told they
have been chosen to sit in a civil trial, and told what courtroom to
report to and when. When they arrive, they are greeted by a person
who appears to be a judge, wearing a robe. They are escorted
between the jury room and the court room by court personnel.
Lawyers stand in their presence. Thus, from a juror's perspective,
the summary jury trial has all the trappings of an ordinary trial, and
thus any juror would reasonably believe he was part of an ordinary
trial. In short, Charleston's summary jury trial arguably misleads the
jurors it employs.
While the objection that Charleston's summary jury process
misleads jurors carries some force, the objection is not strong enough
to warrant abandoning the process. Moreover, minor modifications
of Charleston's summary process can fully respond to such
objections. The balance of this Article thus defends this revived
procedural frontier and, in so doing, uses the occasion to raise
questions about access to civil justice more broadly.
III. TORT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

First, however, back up. To appreciate the virtues of Charleston
County's summary jury trial, it is necessary first to focus on the
problems of the civil litigation system, purported and real, which this
innovative procedure avoids. A big topic: what is wrong-and
right-about the civil litigation system is far too large a subject to
treat in any detail here. Even so, the merits of Charleston's
procedure are best appreciated in light of conventional wisdom about
the ills of ordinary civil litigation.
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A. Tort Law and Civil Justice Reform

Among the many critiques of the civil litigation system, none is
voiced as frequently or forcefully as the criticism that there is simply
too much litigation.67 According to dominant images of civil
litigation, the system itself breeds too many cases. Populated by
undeserving litigants, unscrupulous lawyers, unpredictable juries,
and indifferent judges, the civil litigation system rewards those most
able to invent or exaggerate harms.68 Looking to enrich themselves,
litigants are too often willing to bring cases of very questionable
legal merit, which the system invites by imposing liability for nearly
every slight.69
Plaintiff's lawyers oblige. Because the contingency fee system
creates such a powerful incentive for plaintiff's lawyers to bring bad
cases, and overstate good ones, lawyers (aided by expert witnesses
willing to stretch the truth for a price) file claim after claim.7" Juries
close the deal: moved by sympathy for injured plaintiffs, unable to
see through weak testimony or make fine causal distinctions, and
unaware of the adverse economic consequences of large damage
awards, juries reward the litigious with a frequency that is socially
harmful.7
67. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., DEFROCKING TORT DEFORM: STOPPING
PERSONAL INJURY LAWYERS FROM REPEALING EXISTING TORT REFORMS AND EXPANDING
SUE
IN
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(2008),
RIGHTS
TO
http://www.atra.org/reports/Defrocking-TortDeform.pdf; STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH
CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT
REFORM 2 (Comm. Print., Mar. 1996) ("Excessive litigation has an adverse effect on economic
growth, not only in direct costs but in the way the tort system alters individuals' behavior.").
68. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS OF
AUTO-CHOICE
3-5
(Comm.
Print.,
Apr.
1997),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/auto/auto.pdf ("Moreover, the plaintiff's attorneys have an
incentive to inflate medical expenses and wage loss in order to reach a settlement which may not
be warranted by the actual economic damages .... One of the greatest problems is the incentive
to inflate claimed economic damages. Part of this incentive is to recover more money in
compensation.").
69. See PETER WILLIAM HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1990); WALTER OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS; HOW THE NEW LITIGATION
ELITE THREATEN AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW (2003).
70. See, e.g., Edward L. Holloram, III, Medical Malpractice Litigation in Florida:
Discussion of Problems and Recommendations, 26 Nova L. Rev. 331, 353-54 (2001); Christine
Hunt, The Undercivilization of CorporateLaw, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 382 (2008); Glen G. Lammi,
States Face Many Pitfalls When Hiring Contingency Fee Lawyers, in 1997 Andrews Tobacco
Indus. Litig. Rep. 16218 (1997); Anthony Sebok, Dispatchesfrom the Tort Wars Distorting the
Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1494 (2007).
71. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between
Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 345, 347 (1995); Wendy E. Wagner,
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This general picture underlies the influential movement for tort
reform and, more generally, for civil justice "reform." Above all
else, advocates of civil justice reform seek to reduce the amount of
civil litigation.7 2 To that end, they propose reducing the number of
legally cognizable injuries, limiting recoverable damages,
strengthening legal defenses, and imposing other procedural
restrictions that make civil litigation more difficult and, thus, less
common.73 In other words, the "reform" attached to "civil justice
reform" prescribes limiting resort to the civil litigation system
altogether. By making it harder for plaintiffs to bring successful
claims and by reducing the benefits of doing so, civil litigation will
be less common. The movement calls for contraction.
Civil justice reformers usually point to tort litigation to illustrate
their claims about the excesses of civil litigation. Indeed, for civil
justice reformers, the paradigm case capturing what is wrong with
the civil litigation system is the tort plaintiff with exaggerated
injuries who, thanks to a greedy trial lawyer and unscrupulous
expert, recovers a seven-figure damages award from an overly
sympathetic jury, notwithstanding that there is little evidence
establishing a causal connection between the plaintiffs purported
injury and the deep-pocketed defendant's conduct.74 Civil justice
reformers thus seek to purge the civil litigation system of what they
consider to be excessive torts cases.
Yet civil justice reformers prescribe reforms that would alter
more than tort litigation. For the defects of the civil litigation system
they identify-unscrupulous plaintiffs lawyers, high damage
awards, biased juries, liability standards and evidentiary rules too
favorable towards plaintiffs-are global, not limited to torts cases in
particular. Thus tort reformers and their allies have also sought (with
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 828
(1997).
72. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1087 (2005).
73. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA (1991); American Corporate Counsel Association, Policy Statement of
Civil Justice Reform, http://www.acc.com/public/accapolicy/polstat.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2008); American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2008)
(statement of reform agenda); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES (2004).
74. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1990).
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success), for example, reforms curbing certain civil rights cases, 7 5
securities suits,76 and class action litigation generally.77 Tort reform
is the pillar of civil justice reform, but not its sum. Because the civil
litigation system as a whole is too indulgent of plaintiffs, tort

reformers prescribe not merely changes in tort doctrine, but systemic
reforms affecting other types of civil litigation as well.
In any event, according to the critics, the high costs of litigation

is a-if not the-major reason the system requires wholesale reform.
Reformers frequently stress how costly civil litigation is, especially

for civil defendants.
They argue, for example, that because
litigation costs are regrettably high, defendants often pay undeserved
settlements to plaintiffs with weak claims in order to avoid the even
higher costs of litigation.79 Even though such defendants would
likely prevail were they to litigate their cases to the end, the

excessive costs of the process make fully defending

cases

economically irrational. So they capitulate, even where on the merits
they should not.8" Almost as bad, where defendants instead litigate
and win, the civil litigation system requires them to spend a lot to

prevail.
Civil litigation is not just too costly, however.

Again, civil

justice reformers claim that it is too common as well. Litigation is
too common in part because damage awards are unjustifiably high,
and also too easy to obtain."' Juries are too sympathetic towards

75. See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134.
76. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §78u-4 (West
2008).
77. See, e.g., id. at 78u-4(a)(3) (restrictions on class actions in securities cases); 45 C.F.R.
1617.1-.4 (2000) (prohibiting class actions by Legal Service Corporation funding recipients).
See generally Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (d), 1453, 1711-1715 (2005).
78. See, e.g., Matthew G. Vansuch, Icing the JudicialHellholes: Congress' Attempt to Put
Out "Frivolous"Lawsuits Burns a Hole Through the Constitution, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249,
260-63 (2006).
79. See id.; see also Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement "Problem ": The Elusive
Truth and a Clarifying Proposal,31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 221, 252 (2007).
80. See, e.g., Martha L. Cochran, Sweeping Reform: Litigating and Bespeaking Caution
Under the New Securities Law, Appendices, 924 PLI/CORP 31, 728 (1996); Roger S. Haydock,
Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation andArbitration Now
and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 745, 754 (2000); Randy J. Kozel & David
Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90
VA. L. REv. 1849, 1879 (2004).
81. See, e.g., Amy Kolz, Are Punitive Damage Awards Too High?: Two Leading Scholars
Crunch the Numbers and Come Up with Very Different Answers on Jury Awards, AM. LAWYER,
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plaintiffs, 8 2 they do not fully understand the economic consequences
of adding zeros to damage awards, and thus they tend to
overcompensate plaintiffs. Easy compensation breeds excessive
litigation.
Plaintiffs with weak or even frivolous cases also benefit from
evidentiary standards that are too lax;83 plaintiffs press their cases
with "junk science."" Or, short of junk science, the civil litigation
system's indulgence of fringe science enables plaintiffs with weak
claims to move their cases past summary judgment. As a result,
plaintiffs prevail based on causal theories that are scientifically
unsupported. In short, because the rules of the game are biased
against defendants, plaintiffs recover both too frequently and too
much.
Plaintiffs are not the only ones overcompensated. Plaintiffs
lawyers too are a favorite target of civil justice reformers.85 Because
they stand to receive such a large portion of any money their
prevailing clients are awarded, tort lawyers file dubious cases.86
They need not win every case, or even most of them. As long as
they hit it big once in a while, they have the incentive to bring lots of
cases of questionable merit, not knowing until after the fact which
particular cases strike gold.87 Thus plaintiffs and plaintiffs lawyers
play the civil litigation "lottery," filing many weak cases, all of
which require defendants to mount expensive defenses, and profiting
from the exceptional big wins.88 Here again, the target of reformers
Reformers argue that plaintiffs
extends beyond tort lawyers.
lawyers in general-including, for example, securities lawyers,
consumer class-action lawyers, "clientless" public-interest lawyers,

Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1138269913844
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
82. See generally VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2000) (examining and testing common perception of excessive jury sympathy
towards plaintiffs).

83.

See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM

20(1991).
84. Id. at 3.
85.

See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 67, at 7.

86.

See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM, supra note 67, at 2.

87. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND. supra note 67, at 2.
88. See id. at 14-15.
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and impact litigators-all contribute to an overly litigious and
excessively expensive civil litigation system.89
The reformers' critique raises difficult questions, however. For
example, if tort reformers are correct that litigation costs are so high,
why do those costs not discourage plaintiffs from bringing their weak
and frivolous suits in the first place? If litigation costs are high, then
they are high for all potential litigants. As such, they should
discourage parties from initiating litigation, as the higher the costs of
initiating litigation, the lower the expected net returns.
While tort reformers commonly identify the nuisance suit as one
of the civil litigation system's main defects, it is thus not clear how
plaintiffs could get away with such suits, given high litigation costs.
A party seeking a nuisance recovery must credibly present the case
as if that party would fully litigate the claim absent settlement. In
other words, nuisance suits have to constitute credible nuisances.
But the very incentive for defendants to settle cases that are strong
for them should also discourage plaintiffs from pursuing cases that
are weak for them. After all, for every defendant who refuses to
settle, some plaintiffs have to litigate or else abandon the case. In
other words, the plaintiff must incur significant costs (of discovery,
motion practice, and so on) in order to press on. If those costs deter
parties with strong defenses from litigating, presumably they also
deter parties with weak claims from litigating. By focusing on how
high litigation costs affect only defendants and not plaintiffs, tort
reformers ignore half of the analysis.
Yet the burdens of proof and persuasion carried by civil
plaintiffs put the onus on them to substantiate claims that a defendant
committed a legal wrong. This burden translates to a greater-and
often earlier-discovery burden for plaintiffs. For example, the
plaintiff has to put together a case before the defendant does, which
is to say finance the factual and legal research leading up to filing a
claim. Once a case is filed, the plaintiff has to play offense, whereas
the defendant largely responds to investments in a case the plaintiff
makes first. Thus, the plaintiff must produce expert reports and
expert testimony before the defendant does. If the plaintiff's expert
fails to provide adequate support for some element of the case, the
defendant can focus on that one element. In short, playing defense
89. See, e.g., CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS (2002).
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means that defendants often can make more focused and, therefore,
often smaller, investments in a case.
None of this is to argue that defendants are unburdened by high
litigation costs. The point, rather, is that while those burdens fall on
plaintiffs as well as defendants, tort reformers do not explain why
those costs hurt defendants so much more. They might have an
explanation, but by not considering how litigation costs discourage
plaintiffs from filing suits or litigating them fully, tort reformers do
not really confront the issue.
After all, the nuisance suit tort reformers emphasize finds a
counterpart-the "nuisance defense"--wherever high litigation costs
effectively force a plaintiff to settle a strong suit too early. In other
words, high costs may lead some plaintiffs to settle before they
should, simply because they cannot afford to press their strong
claims to completion. Some defendants, anticipating that a plaintiff
may be unable to afford to overcome a nuisance defense, are
therefore well positioned to offer a modest settlement, irresistible to
the plaintiff given the costs of litigating to the bitter end. Even if the
plaintiff can afford the absolute costs of pressing an expensive but
legally strong claim, the net benefits of doing so may be smaller than
accepting the defendant's lowball settlement.
Thus, quick
settlements due to high litigation costs do not obviously hurt
defendants more than plaintiffs. Given the costs of litigation, some
defendants may be getting off cheap. Assuming high litigation costs,
the nuisance offer could be harmful to either side.
Whereas civil justice reformers' claims about the implications of
high litigation costs seem incomplete, their claims about excessive
damage awards seem questionable. Available data do not show that
damage awards are excessive.9"
To the contrary, there is
considerable evidence that certain types of plaintiffs are, on average,
undercompensated. 9' For that matter, there is considerable evidence

90. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort Reform:
Scheduling "Painand Suffering", 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 908, 909 (1989) ("Some [tort] reformers,
however, would go even further, barring pain and suffering altogether as an element of personal
injury awards. Nonetheless, empirical findings tend to support the importance of non-economic
losses, even showing that prevailing damage valuations may in fact be too low.").
91. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1116-20 (1996).
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that certain types of potential plaintiffs do not file suit as often as
they are legally injured.92
In addition, aggregate data show median damage awards for
common types of tort actions to be quite modest.93 To be sure, there
are always exceptions. But the exceptions are just that-exceptional.
And here again, civil justice reformers' claims about high damages
are global, not confined to tort litigation. The difficulty is that their
sweeping claims about excessive damage awards find little support
in the data.
But the purpose of this Article is not to evaluate all of the
arguments underlying civil justice reform. The point, instead, is to
highlight some of the core themes of that movement, though to do so
not without awareness of their conceptual and empirical weaknesses.
Notwithstanding such weaknesses, though, civil justice reform has its
strength as a legal and political movement. That movement has led
to numerous legislative and judicial reforms of the civil litigation
system, on both the state and national levels.94 It has powerfully
shaped lay perceptions of the system as well.95
B. Access to Justice
In certain circles, the civil justice reform movement's influence
competes with a very different picture of civil litigation. According
to this alternative, civil litigation is riot common enough. Among
legal aid lawyers, civil rights lawyers, and legal advocates for the
poor, in particular, but also among many parts of the organized bar,
there is broad consensus that many deserving would-be civil litigants
lack legal representation,96 even though they would have strong legal
claims if only they could manage to bring them. On this view, many
types of civil claims are, therefore, underlitigated.
The tort

92. See generally LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4, 11
http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%20GapFINAL 1001.pdf (Sept. 2005)
(providing several quantitative measures of under-representation of the poor and the middle
classes).
93. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS
IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (2004);.
94. See generally Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 72, at 1031-33.
95. Id.
96. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 92.
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reformers' image of excessive litigation and frivolous claims thus
competes with a contrasting picture of unrepresented potential
plaintiffs and meritorious claims.9 7
Proponents of greater "access to justice" want to change this.
They therefore advocate for greater representation of individuals who
do not file civil suits that they should. Greater access to justice
requires more than lawyers willing to take pro bono cases, however.
Just as tort reformers pursue their goal of minimizing civil litigation
by prescribing reforms that make civil litigation more difficult and
less attractive for plaintiffs, so do those who advocate for greater
access to justice prescribe reforms that would make civil litigation
more feasible for underrepresented parties and more attractive to
lawyers who would take their cases. Such calls routinely take the
form of arguments for increased funding for legal-aid and legalservices organizations.9"
More dramatically, the American Bar
Association has supported a "civil Gideon" right to counsel for
certain categories of civil litigants.99
Just like tort reformers, access-to-justice advocates emphasize
the high costs of litigation,' 0 though for them the victims of higher
costs are found on the other side of the "v.," or would be, but for
excessive costs. Because litigation costs are high, would-be plaintiffs
cannot find adequate representation, as lawyers unable to cover those
costs cannot afford to take cases, especially where recoverable
damages are modest. Even though many would-be plaintiffs would
likely prevail were they to litigate, the costs of the process itself
make bringing cases economically irrational.
97. See generally DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). For visions of litigation
challenging those of civil litigation reformers see, for example, TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA:
DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); WILLIAM HALTOM
& MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW, POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS
(2004).
98. See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Grey, Jr., President, American Bar Assoc., to Sen.
Richard C. Shelby and Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/109th/legalservllscfunds062005.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2008).
99. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (112A) 7
(Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (resolution unanimously approved by the ABA House of Delegates).
"To shorthand it, we need a civil Gideon, that is, an expanded constitutional right to counsel in
civil matters." Id.
100. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 92, at 13-14.
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Like civil justice reformers, access-to-justice advocates also
emphasize damage awards. According to them, however, high
damages are rare. Unable to sue, many would-be plaintiffs go
uncompensated for their injuries. Even when they do bring suit,
plaintiffs often do not recover for the full extent of their injuries.
Again, like civil justice reformers, access-to-justice advocates
also emphasize attorney compensation, though for them plaintiffs
attorneys are not over- but undercompensated. Precisely because
they are, plaintiffs attorneys often cannot afford to represent many
deserving plaintiffs. Especially where plaintiffs seek injunctive or
declaratory relief instead of damages,"' and cannot themselves afford
to pay for hourly representation-the unavailability of attorney's fees
or recent limits on attorney's fees again means plaintiffs with strong
cases often cannot find willing representation.
But access-to-justice advocates are not concerned with attorney
compensation in the abstract. Attorney compensation matters
because proving plaintiffs' cases can be a laborious, resourceintensive task. That is, contrary to tort reformers claims about the
burdens of litigation on defendants, those advocating for greater
access to justice argue that the rules of civil litigation are often
For example,
biased in favor of defendants, not plaintiffs.
exhaustion requirements and high evidentiary burdens tilt the playing
field in defendants' favor in many types of cases."°2 As a result, the
costs of bringing such cases are high and, where plaintiffs lawyers
are only modestly paid, insurmountable.
C. Access to Justicefor Tort Plaintiffs?
Tort reformers and access-to-justice advocates thus paint
contrasting pictures of the civil litigation system-to say the leastand accordingly seek very different changes to that system.
Interestingly, however, neither camp much engages the claims made
by the other. Tort reformers simply ignore claims concerning lack of
adequate legal representation for many potential plaintiffs, painting
101. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 610 (2001); Evans v. JeffD., 475 U.S. 717, 723 (1986).
102. See, e.g., Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an EnvironmentalExpert? The Impact of Daubert,
Joiner and Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 401, 427 (2001) ("Defendants still are placed in a favorable position because the burden
of proof of admissibility rests with the plaintiffs.").
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instead with the broadest of reform strokes, as if every civil plaintiff
is an undeserving tort plaintiff. Advocates of greater access to
justice, meanwhile, ignore the arguments of the tort reformers,
leaving to others the task of defending civil litigation as such.
It is no accident that tort reformers and access-to-justice
advocates have seen little direct engagement. For their part, accessto-justice advocates have steered clear of responding to many of the
tort reformers' arguments probably because doing so would be
impolitic. Those championing access to justice do not need the
extra-and substantial-burden of defending the tort system. Nor
would defending tort plaintiffs win many sympathizers. Access-tojustice advocates' failure to include tort victims to their roster of the
underrepresented is one strong measure of the tort reform
movement's influence: That debate is too big to take on,
notwithstanding that legal representation is often unavailable to
would-be tort plaintiffs as well as those facing eviction, seeking
public assistance, or requiring civil protection from domestic abuse.
On the other side of the divide, tort reformers' agenda leads
them simply to ignore issues concerning access to civil justice. Civil
justice reformers seek not exactly to "reform" the civil litigation
system so much as to minimize it,"°3 although that distinction is not
one they would emphasize. Because they view the system on the
unwavering assumption that it produces too many lawsuits resulting
in excessive damages, they do not distinguish between types of
plaintiffs who bring too much litigation and those who bring too
little. For tort reformers, all plaintiffs belong to the former group;
the civil litigation system spawns undesirable litigiousness across the
board. Because the institution of civil litigation is too indulgent of
plaintiffs across the board, litigation reform is an across-the-board
project.
Moreover, were tort reformers to characterize some types of
litigation as too infrequent, or some class of plaintiffs as
underrepresented, that would undermine their global claims about the
ills of litigation. That is, distinguishing among types of cases that are
brought too often and those that are brought too infrequently would
103. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & David F. Partlett, An America's Cup for Tort Reform?
Australia and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 443, 448-49 (1988); Michael L.
Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and
Consumers, 48 RUTGERs L. REV. 673, 681 (1996).
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raise questions about why-and whether-the same civil litigation
system creates both. Or, put differently, because civil justice
reformers' arguments are cast in general terms, conceding that some
types of plaintiffs file too few lawsuits would call into question not
only the scope of the reformers' claims, but also the premises
underlying them. Better to keep their message simple.
Yet, civil rights plaintiffs, tenants, consumer debtors, and socialwelfare beneficiaries are not all who find inadequate legal
representation. Rather, the high costs of litigation commonly
emphasized by civil justice reformers imply that one class of tort
plaintiffs is also very likely to be unrepresented-tort plaintiffs who
have suffered harms that do not exceed the costs of bringing suit.
High litigation costs may burden defendants, but unless tort litigation
is free, those costs are most problematic for plaintiffs whose
expected damage awards are unlikely to exceed the cost of litigating.
Because tort plaintiffs who have suffered low-damage harms also
deserve legal vindication-for a variety of reasons sounding in
deterrence and fairness-tort reformers as well as advocates for
greater access to justice should embrace their cause.
IV. THE MERITS OF CHARLESTON'S
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS

Fortunately, Charleston's summary jury trial provides access to
justice for plaintiffs who, given the small size of their claims relative
to the costs of traditional civil litigation, would otherwise lack
access. What is more, it does so without presenting any of the
problems identified by tort reformers. Thus, even assuming for the
purposes of argument that tort reformers paint an accurate critical
picture of civil litigation, those skeptical of tort litigation generally
should have no objection to summary jury trials.
A. Advantages

In particular, Charleston's summary jury trials provide access to
plaintiffs, almost all tort plaintiffs, whose potential damage awards
usually range from the low thousands to several tens of thousands of
dollars. Million-dollar lawsuits, even low six-digit lawsuits, are not
litigated through the summary jury trial process. Although the
proponents of the summary jury trial of the 1980s saw the process as
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perfectly suitable for complex, high-stakes litigation,"° that is not the
type of litigation for which summary jury trials are used in
Charleston.
Rather, the paradigm summary jury trial case in Charleston is a
simple torts case, involving an automobile accident or a slip-and-fall,
in which a plaintiff allegedly suffered significant but not life-altering
injuries as a result of the defendant's conduct. To the plaintiff, those
harms are real and substantial-they typically include some lost
wages, medical bills, and some pain and suffering-but they are not
astronomical. Summary jury trials provide one avenue of potential
relief for such a plaintiff.
Consider, for example, the situation of a plaintiff involved in a
minor auto-pedestrian accident where traditional litigation provides
A plaintiff might allege that he suffered
his only recourse.
significant but not permanent injuries due to the defendant driver's
negligence. Assume that, given the pedestrian's injuries (time off
work, pain and suffering, etc.), roughly twenty thousand dollars
would compensate him fully. Finally, assume that this plaintiffs
liability case is strong though not certain-it would be fairly easy to
show that the driver was negligent, if a factfinder believed the
plaintiffs credible testimony-and that demonstrating twenty
thousand dollars of harm would also be straightforward, but that it is
improbable the plaintiff could demonstrate harm greater than that.
Such a plaintiff is in no easy position. Suppose this plaintiff
sought legal representation, necessary to bring a successful suit. At a
contingency fee rate of one-third, a lawyer contemplating taking the
plaintiffs case would have to conclude that he or she would not
spend much more than six thousand dollars on the case (that is, on
ordinary overhead and the opportunity cost of time). Were the
prospective lawyer uncertain the plaintiff would prevail-and a
contingency-fee lawyer can be certain of very little-he or she
would discount the expected contingency fee by the probability of
victory. Given these realistic assumptions, the difficulty here is
simple: an uncertain (i.e., discounted) six thousand dollars is often
too little to justify the overhead costs of the case. For lawyers who
absorb their clients' out-of-pocket costs in the event the client does
not prevail, the overall expected value of the case is even lower.
104. See Lambros, supra note 13, at 472.
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Many lawyers would not take such a case, given its low
expected value, realizing that such cases are unlikely to prove
profitable in the end. But assume for the purposes of argument that
the plaintiff could find a lawyer willing to take the case. Now the
plaintiffs share of the damage award is just over thirteen thousand
dollars ($20,000 x .666), on the strong assumption that the plaintiff is
certain to prevail. Assuming instead that the plaintiff is 75 percent
likely to prevail-a strong case indeed-the plaintiffs expected
award is under ten thousand dollars (and the attorney's compensation
under five thousand, making it even more unlikely to be worth any
attorney's time, overhead, and possible expenses). But assume the
plaintiff also has to cover the out-of-pocket costs of the lawsuit,
including all expenses incident to discovery (deposition costs, expert
fees, etc.). The problem is now that those costs mount quickly, and
even in simple cases can easily approach or exceed the plaintiffs
share of the expected damage award. Where they do, the plaintiffas opposed to the plaintiffs lawyers-cannot afford to litigate the
case. What this plaintiff really needs is an opportunity to litigate in a
way that does not cost as much as he could hope to recover.
Summary jury trials provide that opportunity.
To suggest that summary jury trials are beneficial to a class of
plaintiffs-high-liability,
low-damages
plaintiffs-raises
the
question whether they could also benefit defendants. After all, if the
procedure helps plaintiffs, presumably by inverse logic it harms
defendants. Not necessarily: in the typical Charleston summary jury
trial case, the defendant is covered by a liability insurance policy,
usually with a fairly low policy limit. The nominal defendant is the
tortfeasor, but his or her insurance company is not far in the
background (like in most tort cases). Were the plaintiff to prevail
and be awarded damages exceeding the coverage amount, the
defendant would be liable for the amount of damages exceeding the
policy limit, and the insurer would be liable up to the policy limit.
In virtually every case tried by summary jury in Charleston,
however, the plaintiff and defendant agree to a "high/low." If the
plaintiff prevails, the plaintiff receives whatever amount the jury
awards, unless that amount is higher than the "high" or lower than
the "low." In other words, the parties agree in advance upon a
damages floor and ceiling. The agreed upon "low" is typically
around five thousand dollars-an amount, one strongly suspects, that
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roughly covers the out-of-pocket costs of this inexpensive form of
litigation. The agreed upon "high" is virtually always an amount
equal to the insurance policy limit. Therefore, the defendant's own
exposure is virtually always zero, for even if the defendant loses the
summary jury trial, damages are capped at the policy maximum. Of
course, individual defendants still prefer not to lose, as there are
collateral consequences-higher insurance rates for drivers, the
stigma of having been sued and lost, and so on. But the immediate
economic exposure is next to nothing. So the summary jury trial is
attractive to defendants, as well as to plaintiffs.
The insurance companies who finance the legal defense through
volume contracts with local defense firms also benefit. When a
defendant wins, the insurance companies pay nothing. When a
plaintiff prevails on liability but the jury returns a small verdict on
damages, the insurance companies pay something, but less than the
amount of their exposure. What the insurance companies require,
then, are local counsel who can try the cases and minimize the total
amount the companies have to pay. Because the summary jury trial
process is fast and inexpensive, insurance companies get a cheap
opportunity to minimize their liability. Moreover, local defense
firms pass on savings to the insurance companies. They do so
because they make smaller bids for the companies' volume contracts
than they would make if they had to litigate their cases through
traditional processes.
There is a more subtle dynamic at work as well. In a world
where ordinary civil trials are rare, in both the state systems
(including South Carolina) as well as in the federal system," 5 defense
attorneys appreciate the chance to try cases, including summary jury
trials. Their enthusiasm for the process owes in part, then, to the
experience it provides, which also motivates the defense bar to make
even more attractive bids for the insurance companies' volume work.
In short, all three sides benefit. Plaintiffs get their day in court,
which they (and their lawyers) could (or would) not otherwise afford.
In exchange for having their day in court, plaintiffs agree to "highs"
defined by liability policy limits that allow defendants to avoid
105. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Judith Resnick,
Migrating,Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial
Rates in Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2003).
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personal exposure. And insurance companies reap the benefit of
inexpensive dispute resolution processes in the form of cheaper
volume contracts with local defense counsel.
There is more: individual defendants and their insurance
companies enjoy another benefit from an inexpensive adjudication
process. To return to the auto-pedestrian example above, a defendant
(or insurance company) who had to pay to defend a case worth at
most twenty thousand dollars would, like the plaintiff, also be in a
difficult position. Because litigating such a case could quickly
become more expensive than settling it, especially given that the
defendant or insurance company is paying legal fees by the hour, the
defendant might prefer a quick resolution. To the extent tort
reformers are right, defendants might even be willing to settle weak
claims rather than incur the cost of defense.
The summary jury trial provides defendants and insurance
companies with a quick and inexpensive alternative. Without
making a large investment to mount a defense, and without having to
incur the costs of playing "expense chicken" with plaintiff's
attorneys, summary jury trials provide defendants a low-cost
opportunity to prevail. In other words, by using a summary jury
trial, the defendant too gets cheaper access to justice. In the worst
case, the defendant pays whatever amount the jury determines
Under such
(though within the agreed upon high/low).
circumstances, the summary process provided an inexpensive
mechanism for resolving a settlement impasse (without which there
would be no need for a summary jury trial, or any trial).
Charleston
To be sure, it all could fall out differently.
defendants might instead play hardball, attempting to price plaintiffs
out of litigation, even where a plaintiffs liability case is strong.
Plaintiffs might play hardball too, seeking to run up defendants' legal
expenses in hopes of a settlement, especially when a plaintiffs case
is weak. In general, where litigation costs can go high enough to
outweigh the expected benefit either side would receive from
prevailing, litigation becomes a contest about which side can
credibly show that it can afford to-and will-litigate further."0 6 But
Charleston defendants and plaintiffs frequently opt not to play
106. See generally Hedieh Nasheri & David L. Rudolph, Equal Protection Under the Law:
Improving Access to Civil Justice, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 331, 335-36 (1996) ("Accordingly,
settlement figures are sometimes determined by which side runs out of money first.").
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hardball. Often, plaintiffs and defendants apparently find it in their
mutual interest not to wage a war of attrition, perhaps because in
low-stakes cases both sides can so easily lose (by spending more on
the fight than the fight is worth). Especially where liability policy
limits are low, which makes insurance companies low-stakes
litigants as well, the plaintiff and defendant bars have found a way to
cooperate rather than run up the other side's litigation costs.
Undoubtedly, many cases do fall out differently. After all, not
all cases go to summary jury trial. And like everywhere else, many
civil cases in Charleston County settle, and still other cases are
resolved through ordinary civil trials. Maybe some defendants offer
plaintiffs unjustifiably low settlements, sensing that those plaintiffs
cannot afford to litigate their meritorious claims very far. Maybe-if
tort reformers are right-some plaintiffs receive settlements for weak
cases from defendants who simply want to avoid the high costs of
traditional litigation. Comparing summary jury trial cases against all
other cases that settle or go to trial through normal processes (and
holding everything else equal) would be extremely difficult. Some
South Carolina litigants may pay too much, or receive too little.
Others may spend more litigating than they gain by litigating,
intentionally or not.
Yet many Charleston plaintiffs and defendants opt for the
summary jury trial process. In fact, roughly half of all civil trials in
Charleston County (a small percentage of all civil cases, obviously)
are summary jury trials. This level of support for the process among
both local plaintiff's attorneys and defense attorneys is striking.
If the analysis here is correct, this finding makes some sense:
Given the profile of the typical summary jury trial plaintiff, and the
costs of ordinary litigation, it seems likely that plaintiffs who elect
the summary process would generally be unable to afford the
ordinary trial process. For them, the availability of summary jury
trials means greater access to civil justice. For their adversaries,
summary jury trials mean lower litigation costs, which is economical
in low-dollar cases where such costs can quickly exceed liability
payments even near policy limits.
But there is more good news. Providing access to justice for tort
plaintiffs through summary jury trials does not exacerbate the
problems with civil litigation that civil justice reformers-rightly or
wrongly-emphasize.
Recall three of their favorite themes:
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litigation is too expensive (a theme shared by access-to-justice
advocates), damages are unpredictable and frequently excessive, and
procedural and evidentiary rules are biased against defendants. None
of these complaints stick to the summary jury trial. To the contrary,
the summary process avoids all of them.
As already mentioned, summary jury trials are inexpensive,
which is the very reason parties use them. Whereas the original
federal summary jury trials championed by Judge Lambros added
costs to litigation because they constituted an additional step in the
ordinary litigation process-one that may or may not (and in practice
usually did not) avoid ordinary trials-Charleston's summary jury
trial instead fully replaces the ordinary trial. In addition, the out-ofpocket costs of the summary jury trial itself are very low. For
participating attorneys, the cost of summary jury trials is time. But
because they are scheduled on a date certain, start on time, and run
through to the end, the time spent on summary jury trials is very
small relative to that consumed by ordinary trials.
Summary jury trials are not simply shorter than ordinary trials in
elapsed trial time, however. They are also shorter in the sense that
litigants spend no time traveling back and forth to court, waiting for
their turn on the docket, adjourning while the court conducts other
business, and so on. Unlike all other litigants, summary jury trial
litigants have their judge's undivided attention. Summary jury trials
are fast because they compete with no other cases on any court
docket or calendar.
While the smaller costs of the trial itself are significant,
however, they are not the only reason the process is cheaper. First,
trial preparation costs, which are significant for ordinary trials, are
lower as well. For example, summary jury trial attorneys need not
spend time on the many facets of witness preparation-going over
testimony, reviewing documents, conducting mock examinations or
cross-examinations, and so on-given that they can provide
summary testimony without witnesses. Avoiding laborious witness
preparation is a significant savings.
Trial preparation cost-savings is not the only one. Because
summary jury trials relax the rules of evidence, litigants do not spend
a lot of time filing and responding to pretrial evidentiary motions.
This is not to say never, however. Summary jury trial litigants can
and do file motions in limine, for example. Even so, summary jury
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trial litigants do not litigate evidentiary issues--or any others-to
death. There is no need, nor occasion, to do so.
Pretrial discovery, which also generates major expenses in
ordinary civil litigation, is also less expensive. Parties may elect the
summary jury trial early in the life of a case, which they often do, or
later, after the case has progressed for a while. The earlier they elect
a summary jury trial, the more their discovery can be tailored to the
summary process. Like the summary jury trial itself, discovery in
cases suitable for the summary process is less extensive. That is,
knowing that a case will be summary-jury tried means litigants can
economize on discovery as well. For all of these reasons, the high
costs of litigation that tort reformers emphasize are not much present
in cases using the summary jury trial process.
Civil justice reformers also claim that tort damages are often too
high, and in any event too uncertain to be low. The prospect of
excessive damages, in their view, both inspires too much litigation
by plaintiffs and punishes defendants too often. Neither can be said
about summary jury trials. As explained, damages are capped by the
high/low the parties set in advance. Thus, damages are never very
high, and never unexpectedly high. Nor is there much uncertainty
about damages; the sole function of the jury in a summary case is to
determine liability and assess damages somewhere within a chosen
range.
Given their low cost, summary jury trials are well designed for
combating the nuisance suits that civil justice reformers also decry.
Given that summary jury trials are inexpensive, defendants are not
faced with the choice between high litigation costs and quick
settlement. Instead, defendants can call nuisance plaintiffs' bluffs.
By forcing such plaintiffs to air their weak claims in a summary trial,
defendants are likely to prevail against frivolous litigation, and the
cost of prevailing is not likely to be greater than the settlement
avoided.
Civil justice reformers also claim that the rules of evidence and
other institutional biases work in plaintiffs' favor, and thus also
encourage excessive litigation and impose unjustifiable liability on
defendants. Here again, none of this can plausibly be said of
summary jury trials. As already explained, the rules of evidence are
equally relaxed for both sides, at the initiative of both and, moreover,
to the specifications of both. Furthermore, if juries are biased at all,
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their bias is cabined by the damages range to which the parties have
agreed. In short, there is nothing about the procedure itself that
works systematically in favor of plaintiffs or against defendants.
Instead, summary jury trials provide plaintiffs and defendants the
benefit of resolution of their cases by unbiased decision-makers,
applying neutral procedural and evidentiary rules of the parties' own
choosing.
B. Objection and Response
Notwithstanding these considerable advantages, the process is
susceptible to criticism. In particular, some might object on the
grounds that Charleston's summary jury process conscripts jurors.
According to some reports-which are hard to verify and hard to
disprove--one or more summary jurors has complained for not
having been told about the nature of the process in which they-at
the time unwittingly-participated. True or not, one might object to
the use of real jurors in summary jury trials.
This objection to using summoned jurors for summary jury trials
sees the summary jury trial process as purely private. On this view,
the state court allows parties to use county courtrooms, marshals, and
other court personnel to engage in what is essentially a private
process to resolve their dispute. The process could just as well take
place, as other private dispute mechanisms do, in the private office of
the quasi-judge hired to resolve the dispute. Allowing the parties to
use state resources instead amounts to a public subsidy of their
private activity.
But parties to a summary jury trial get more than the free use of
a courtroom. They also get the coercive power of the state over
jurors. As explained, summary jury trial jurors answer a summons
by reporting to the circuit court on their scheduled day. Like
prospective jurors anywhere, they hear about the importance of
performing their civic duty to help administer justice from the circuit
court judge who manages jury selection. To determine their
eligibility to serve on jury panels for the cases scheduled, prospective
jurors are asked questions about whether they know any parties.
Prospective jurors are also asked whether there are other reasons they
would be unable to serve, including questions about their health and
whether they are the primary care giver of a child under seven years
of age. Prospective jurors who indicate they may be unable to serve
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are further questioned by the presiding circuit judge. As mentioned
above, jurors are selected for all trials scheduled for a given week,
including the summary jury trials. Paneled jurors are told to report in
their assigned courtrooms.
Summary jury trial jurors had better not forget their courtroom
assignments. While the Charleston County courthouse-a beautiful,
high-tech courthouse-has screens mounted throughout indicating
the courtroom numbers for all trials taking place at a given time,
summary jury trials do not appear on the monitors, a fact that
captures their semi-private status. Likewise, when a summary jury
trial is over, the results are recorded as settlements, not as judgments
of the court. The whole process thus blurs the line between public
and private dispute resolution. Certainly there is little question that
many summary jury trial jurors would fail to understand the nature of
the process of which they are part.
Given that summary jury trials come with most of the trappings
of an ordinary civil trial, many jurors would instead assume they
were hearing an ordinary civil case. Among other reasons they
would think so, summary jury trial jurors are commanded by the
summary jury trial judge. For example, at the beginning of a
summary jury trial, as with any other trial, the judge both explains to
the jury how important the case is to the parties before them, and
instructs the jury to give the case their undivided attention.
Additionally, the judge also admonishes the jury not to discuss the
case among themselves during recesses, an admonition typically
repeated at the lunch break. The summary jury trial judge thus
conveys a certain authority over the jury.
There are compelling responses to any objection about the use of
summary jurors, however. First, parties could, were they so inclined,
stipulate to conduct a summary trial before an ordinary circuit court
judge, and agree not to be bound by ordinary evidentiary rules and
not to make evidentiary objections. And they could do so without
informing the jury. Indeed, in the typical final settlement conference
in ordinary cases, parties make informal arguments to the judge
without applying formal rules of procedure or evidence. There is no
reason that parties could not do much the same in open court, using
an ordinary judge and jury to adjudicate, informally, their dispute.
And, the parties could do so without informing the jury that that is
what they are doing. In fact, parties could also contractually agree
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not to appeal a summary trial verdict, much as criminal defendants
can agree to waive their rights to a criminal appeal of certain issues
in exchange for a plea agreement. Thus, it is not the nature of the
summary process itself that gives rise to any compelling objection
about the use of summary jurors. Instead, the objection must focus
on the absence of a real judge, and perhaps relatedly, on the fact that
Charleston's summary verdicts are entered as settlements rather than
as judgments of the circuit court.
But can the absence of a real presiding circuit court judge make
a crucial difference, such that jurors have no objection to the
summary process as long as a real circuit court judge presides? Do
jurors have a valid objection if a deputized judge presides over the
process instead? One response highlights the parties' stipulated
order designating the summary jury trial judge as a circuit court
judge for the limited purposes of the case. On one view of the
parties stipulated order, the summary jury trial judge is a judge, made
so by court order giving the summary jury trial judge the powers of
an ordinary judge. Thus, there is nothing objectionable about a
summary jury trial judge looking like a judge and acting like one. To
be sure, a summary jury trial judge, acting alone, would not have the
power to require jurors' attendance in court, to enforce summonses,
or to hold in contempt jurors who fail to appear. But the circuit court
itself has such power. And the court itself, not the summary trial
judge, has sensibly saw fit to use its power to require citizens to
report for jury duty and serve in summary jury trials.
Moreover, the source of a citizen's interest not to serve on a
summary jury trial is unclear. For one thing, summary jury trials are
less burdensome on jurors, who fulfill their jury duty more quickly.
Relative to ordinary trials, summary jury service thus requires less of
the juror. Of course, a system such as Charleston's that uses
summary jury trials is likely to have more total trials-because they
are less expensive-so that the chance that a citizen will be called to
serve on any jury is greater. But it seems implausible that the Court
owes citizens any duty not to increase the number of trials for which
they might be required to serve, or likewise that citizens have any
interest, in the abstract, in not serving on any jury. To the contrary,
the legal system considers jury service to be a duty of citizenship,
and how many or how few trials the Court deems desirable is not an
issue on which citizens as such have any obvious stake. Moreover,
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the court plainly has the power to alter its procedural and evidentiary
rules in a way that would make trials more frequent, for example, by
conducting summary trials with real judges. In that event, the juror's
objection to summary jury duty disappears (or else reduces exactly to
the objection to a deputized rather than real judge).
Yet, the objection continues, summary jurors are misled; they
are not told they are participants in a summary jury trial. Here again,
however, the source of a juror's interest not to be misled is not
entirely clear. For one thing, withholding information from jurors is
a standard practice. Jurors often are not told about damages caps,
treble damages rules, and whether the parties before them have
insurance coverage. In fact, the rules of evidence generally are well
understood as rules governing what information jurors may be told
and what will instead be withheld. In addition, jurors are not told
when a judge knows she is very likely to enter a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or grant a new trial, if the jury comes out
a certain way. In short, the legal system routinely withholds
information from juries, and thus the fact that information is
withheld from summary jurors is not, by itself, a powerful objection
to the process.
The objection must hinge not on the court withholding
information from summary jurors, but instead on the fact that they
are not told about the very nature of the process of which they are
part. Withholding that kind of information, it might be argued, is
qualitatively different from withholding the fact that, for example, a
party has a liability insurance policy. Summary jurors are misled
about what it is they are doing.
As it happens, many Charleston summary jury trial judges have
responded to this form of the objection by being more explicit with
summary jury trial jurors about the process. While most wear robes,
some no longer do so, though they continue to occupy the bench and
otherwise function as judges. But the lack of a robe does
communicate something important, if perhaps subtle, about the
nature of the process. Others enter the courtroom not wearing a robe,
and then put it on in front of the jury while explaining to the jury that
the parties before them have agreed to try their cases using an
expedited process more informal than an ordinary trial, and have
enlisted the judge to act as a judge in their case. In short, while the
summary jury trial in most ways follows the choreography of an
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ordinary trial, they now often begin with an explanation to jurors that
they are part of a different process, chosen by the parties. Such
introductory explanations go far to assuage any concerns about
misleading the summary jury.
The Charleston Court could go one step further. It could ask
jurors at venire whether they would be willing to sit on a summary
jury trial panel, if they were so selected. Those who refuse could
then be put back into the jury pool, possibly to be selected for an
ordinary civil or criminal trial. This approach would eviscerate any
objection to the summary jury trial on the grounds that jurors are
unknowingly conscripted into the process, for only those willing to
serve (for the benefit of a shorter trial) would do so.
On the other hand, one should not overlook the administrative
challenges courts already face in summoning jurors, qualifying
prospective jurors, and managing jury selection. That process would
only be further complicated by requiring courts to perform the
additional task of distinguishing prospective jurors willing to serve
on summary panels from those who are not. That additional burden
should not be imposed lightly. Instead, the higher costs courts would
face should be justified as fully necessary to overcome some
compelling objection, not yet articulated.
CONCLUSION

The high costs of litigation have led to many reforms of
substantive tort law, including damages caps, contractions of
liability, enforcement of liability waivers, defenses and immunities
of various types, and so on. Partially because litigation is so
expensive, civil justice reformers have sought to reduce the scope of
legal liability. Such reforms come as a non sequitur, however. An
alternative response focuses not on curtailing civil liability, but
delivering civil justice at lower costs. That goal motivated the ADR
revolution, which also responded to concerns about the costs of
litigation, though civil justice reformers themselves never much
advocated for ways to deliver civil justice more cheaply.
Advocates for greater access to justice have argued for
delivering civil justice at lower costs. But those calling for greater
access to justice do not often do so on behalf of tort plaintiffs.
Rather, these advocates focus on the poor, who deserve and badly
need their attention. Meanwhile, though, the high cost of litigation
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means that many low-dollar tort plaintiffs, except in the simplest of
cases, are also often priced out of the market for legal representation.
Because competent plaintiffs attorneys seldom take low-dollar tort
cases, and certainly not where there are disputed facts that will
require substantial discovery or the introduction of contested expert
opinion, low-dollar would-be tort plaintiffs often go unrepresented.
Or, where they do find representation, the expense of ordinary
litigation consumes much of their potential recovery.
The summary jury trial-or, at least, Charleston County's
version of it-provides access to civil justice for a class of plaintiffs
whose damages are not large enough to justify ordinary litigation.
Those concerned about access to justice should thus embrace
summary jury trials, at least until improved ways to provide access
through ordinary litigation is developed. Better still, voluntary,
binding summary jury trials also avoid the problems that preoccupy
civil justice reformers. Summary jury trial verdicts are predictable,
and lend themselves to no evidentiary or procedural biases. Indeed,
litigants in a summary jury trial define their own range of
recoverable damages, thereby eliminating surprise damage awards,
and they largely choose their own evidentiary and procedural rules as
well.
To be sure, the summary jury trial is neither a perfect procedure,
nor suitable for every kind of case. But where both plaintiffs and
defendants have freely chosen it, their adoption of the process should
be encouraged. More than that, the virtues of the process merit state
subsidization, at least in the form of employing otherwise
unoccupied courtrooms and underemployed court personnel.
The employment of unwitting jurors presents a more
complicated question, but only slightly so. In principle, concealing
from summary jurors the nature of the process is not so different
from other types of information concealed from ordinary jurors.
More importantly, jurors, as such, do not have any compelling claim
to avoid summary jury duty, nor do citizens as such have any claim
to avoiding jury duty altogether. Or, if that is wrong, then minor
modifications of the process, disclosing more to summary jurors,
would be far preferable to abandoning summary jury trials. South
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Carolina has developed a system well worth emulating in appropriate
cases.

10 7

107. As of this writing, attorney groups in California, having heard about Charleston's
summary jury process, are considering preparing a proposal for their Supreme Court to pilot a
summary jury trial program. Meanwhile, the South Carolina Supreme Court has just approved a
pilot program for summary jury trials throughout that state. Finally, the well respected American
Board of Trial Advocates is also considering advocating greater use of summary jury trials
throughout the states. These are welcome developments.

